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Abstract—With the fast popularization of mobile devices and
wireless networks, along with advances in sensing and positioning
technology, we are witnessing a huge proliferation of Location-
based Services (LBSs). Location anonymization refers to the
process of perturbing the exact location of LBS users as a
cloaking region such that a user’s location becomes indistin-
guishable from the location of a set of other users. However,
existing location anonymization techniques focus primarily on
single level unidirectional anonymization, which fails to control
the access to the cloaking data to let data requesters with
different privileges get information with varying degrees of
anonymity. In this demonstration, we present a toolkit for
ReverseCloak, a location perturbation system to protect location
privacy over road networks in a multi-level reversible manner,
consisting of an ‘Anonymizer’ GUI to adjust the anonymization
settings and visualize the multilevel cloaking regions over road
network for location data owners and a ‘De-anonymizer’ GUI
to de-anonymize the cloaking region and display the reduced
region over road network for location data requesters. With the
toolkit, we demonstrate the practicality and effectiveness of the
ReverseCloak approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of low-cost GPS-enabled mobile devices
and the ubiquitous deployment of wireless networks drive the
rapid emergence of location-based service applications. While
location-based services find numerous potential benefits, they
also open new doors for privacy threats. For example, through
statistical analysis of usual haunts of the users, an attacker can
speculate about user’s private information, such as hobbies,
living habits, health status and so on. Location privacy is a
system-level capability of location-based systems, which con-
trols the access to location information at different spatial and
temporal granularity instead of completely stopping access.
Location anonymization refers to the process of perturbing
the exact location of users as a cloaking region such that a
user’s location becomes indistinguishable from the location
of a set of other users within the region. A subject is said
to be location k-anonymous if her location information is
indistinguishable from that of k− 1 other users in a spatial or
spatio-temporal space. However, a fundamental limitation of
all existing location privacy protection schemes is that location
information once perturbed to provide a certain anonymity
level cannot be reversed to reduce anonymity or the degree
of perturbation. This is especially a serious limiting factor in
multi-level privacy controlled scenarios where different users
of the location information have different levels of access to
the exposed location.
Unlike conventional techniques [1], [2], [4], [7] that focus
on single-level unidirectional location anonymization, Rever-
seCloak [5], [6] allows selective de-anonymization of the
cloaking area when suitable access credentials are provided.
It supports multilevel location privacy requirements that allow
different users to infer different levels of information from
the same exposed location information based on their access
credentials and the access privilege levels entitled to them. Our
proposed approaches transform the raw location of a mobile
user into a cloaked location region such that finer location
information can be obtained through careful de-anonymization
using a shared secret anonymization key. However, without
the secret key, the cloaked region preserves strong privacy
properties, allowing no additional information to be inferred
even when the adversary has complete knowledge about the
location perturbation algorithm used. In this paper, we design
a demonstration toolkit for ReverseCloak, which consists of
an ‘Anonymizer’ and a ‘De-anonymizer’ GUI. The location
data owners can set and adjust the anonymization parameters
through the ‘Anonymizer’ GUI and the results of multiple
cloaking regions are visualized for them. The ‘De-anonymizer’
GUI allows the location data requesters to fetch the access
keys and the de-anonymized cloaking region can also be
visualized. With the toolkit, we demonstrate the practicality
and effectiveness of proposed ReverseCloak.
II. OVERVIEW
In this section, we first present the concept of location
anonymization. Then, we define the multilevel reversible lo-
cation privacy problem.
A. Location anonymization
We consider the key privacy requirement arising in a road
network namely location k-anonymity [3], which ensures that
the exposed location of a user is indistinguishable from a set
of other users on the road network.
DEFINITION 1 (Location k-anonymity): The location
information of a user is said to be k-anonymous if the location
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information is indistinguishable from the location information
of at least k-1 other users.
In a personalized location privacy model, for each location
anonymization request, the level of k-anonymity is decided by
the user in a customizable manner. Also, in order to bound the
size of the cloaking region that has a direct influence on the
performance of the anonymous query processing technique [7],
[9], a customizable maximum spatial resolution level, denoted
by σs is specified. These two parameters together define the
user-defined privacy profile: (δk, σs).
B. Multilevel reversible location privacy
The focus in ReverseCloak is developing a new class of
reversible cloaking techniques, which can support multi-level
location privacy in access controlled scenarios. In such cases,
the location privacy of users is protected under multiple
privacy levels, with higher anonymity levels for users with
lower privileges and lower privacy levels for users with higher
privileges.
In the multi-level reversible location privacy framework, a
trusted anonymizer obtains the raw location information from
the mobile clients with the user-defined profile. However, with
the multi-level privacy model, the user-defined profile consists
of the privacy requirements for each privacy level, Li, except
L0 referring to a cloaking region with only the segment of
the actual user. Accordingly, the user-defined privacy profile
is represented by (δik, σ
i
s), where 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1 and N
denotes the number of privacy levels. In addition, each privacy
level, Li is associated with a shared secret key, Keyi, which
is used to drive anonymization process for that privacy level.
Therefore, with access to the anonymization key of a particular
privacy level, users of the cloaked location can selectively
de-anonymize the cloaked region to reduce privacy levels to
obtain finer location information. Figure 1 shows an example
of a sub-graph bounded by spatial tolerance. It consists of
a set of segments as the connections of adjacent junctions
and a set of junctions as the intersections of segments. The
segment s18 contains the actual user and belongs to level,
L0. Using the anonymization key Key1, {s17, s22} are added
to reach the privacy level, δ1k of L
1. Then, Key2 is used
further to extend the cloaking region to meet δ2k of level L
2
by adding segments {s14, s15, s19}. Finally, {s9, s21, s24} are
added using the anonymization key, Key3 to reach the highest
privacy level, L3.
Later, when the cloaked location information needs to be
reduced in privacy levels, it can be done using the anonymiza-
tion keys. For instance, for accessing the information at the
lower privilege level, L2, Key3 can be used to exactly identify
and remove the segments {s9, s21, s24} from the cloaking
region to reduce to the cloaked region corresponding to level,
L2. Similarly, using both Key3 and Key2, the segments
{s9, s21, s24, s14, s15, s19} can be identified and removed from
the cloaking region to reduce to level, L1. Therefore, by
merely managing the shared anonymization keys among the
location users at different privilege levels, the whole process
protects location privacy under multiple discrete levels as
customized in the user-defined privacy profile.
III. REVERSECLOAK APPROACHES
In this section, we briefly present the two ReverseCloak al-
gorithms proposed in [6], namely Reversible Global Expansion
(RGE) and Reversible Pre-assignment-based Local Expansion
(RPLE). In ReverseCloak, the cloaking region is formed by
a set of road segments over the road network, which guaran-
tees not only the location k-anonymization [2], but also the
segment l-diversity privacy protection [9]. The anonymization
and de-anonymization process are considered as a continuous
selection and removal of road segments on the geographic road
map respectively. To ensure that the process is reversible, each
road segment is selected in a pseudo-random manner with an
access key. As the location perturbation process is designed to
support multilevel privacy protection, the location perturbation
process employs the use of multiple access keys and each of
them manages the selection and removal of road segments for
one privacy level respectively. Each road segment on the map
is linked to several other segments, which are located close to
it. Once a road segment S is selected during anonymization,
the next selected road segment is from one of its linked
segments. With a certain access key, a fixed segment S′ among
them is deterministically selected. However, without the access
key, all its linked segments would have the same probability to
be selected, thus making the selection process pseudo-random
and making it impossible to reverse without possessing the
access key. Then, during the de-anonymization process (when
a higher privileged data requester possesses the required access
key), the newly selected segment S′ maps to the previous
road segment S using the access key. The algorithms checks
which road segment is linked with S′ to narrow down the
options and whether segment S′ can be deterministically
selected with the access key if we assume a segment is S.
A key challenge in ReverseCloak is the ‘collision’ issue that
could happen in the de-anonymization process. That is, we
may find multiple road segments that meet the conditions
to be the candidate of the previously chosen road segment.
ReverseCloak addresses this issue through two approaches. In
RGE, for each road segment selection during anonymization,
the links of previously selected segments are rebuilt on the
fly to avoid collisions and optimize the selection based on the
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current state. In RPLE, prior to the anonymization process, all
the road segments in the map are pre-assigned their links in a
collision-free manner. RGE has larger anonymization runtime
to build collision-free links on the fly but smaller memory
requirement while RPLE has smaller anonymization runtime
but requires larger memory space to store the collision-free
links.
A. Reversible global expansion
We describe the process of RGE with an example presented
in Figure 2. This example can be seen as either the ith forward
transition in the anonymization process or the {n− i}th
backward transition in the de-anonymization process, where n
is the length of the transition string. The solid segments within
the solid ellipse form the current cloaking region, denoted
by CloakA = {s8, s9, s11}. The dotted segments within the
dotted ellipse but outside the solid ellipse form the current
cloaking region, denoted by CanA = {s6, s10, s14}. Let us
assume that the last added segment for the anonymization
process is s8, denoted by a solid star and the last removed
segment for the de-anonymization process is s14, denoted
by a dotted star. For each addition or removal step, we
assign transition values as IDs to all the possible transitions.
These transition values are organized in a transition table.
The structure of the table and the assignment of transition
values are only related with the two sets. Therefore, for each
addition step in anonymization process and its corresponding
removal step in de-anonymization process, the same table can
be generated. The table should contains |CloakA| rows and
|CanA| columns. In Figure 2, s8, s9, s11 within CloakA and
s6, s10, s14 within CanA are mapped to the three rows and
three columns respectively in the order of segment length so
that the shortest segments are mapped to the 1st row and 1st
column. In the table, each transition value is assigned to one
forward transition and its corresponding backward transition
simultaneously so that these two transitions have the same ID.
The transition value in table cell (i, j) associated with ith row
and jth column is computed by ((i−1)+(j−1))mod |CanA|
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so that there is no repeated transition value in each row and
column if CloakA ≤ CanA, thus no collisions [6].
Algorithm 1: RPLE(Pre-assignment)
Input : Road network graph G, original segment su, temporal key Kt, spatial
key Ks, transition list length T , user defined δk, δl, σt.
Output: forward transition table FT , backward transition table BT .
1 E = No. of segments in G;
2 Initially, the E × T FT and BT are empty;
3 for each segment s in G do
4 for i = 1 to E do
5 Add next neighboring segment to the neighboring list NL;
6 end
7 for i = 0 to E − 1 do
8 Potential segment sp = NL[i];
9 Initialize empFT and empBT with size T ;
10 for j = 0 to T − 1 do
11 if FT [s][j] is empty then
12 Put j to empFT ;
13 end
14 if BT [sp][j] is empty then
15 Put j to empBT ;
16 end
17 end
18 emp = empFT ∩ empBT ;
19 if emp ! = ∅ then
20 selPosition = emp[0];
21 FT [s][selPosition] = sp;
22 BT [sp][selPosition] = s;
23 end
24 end
25 end
Then,the secret key is used to generate a sequence of
pseudo-random numbers and each pseudo-random number
controls the selection of one transition. The ith pseudo-random
number, denoted by Ri, is responsible for both the ith forward
transition and {n− i}th backward transition. Therefore, for
the ith forward transition and {n− i}th backward transition,
the same value can be uniquely determined by the pseudo-
random number and the current cloaking region. This value,
called pick value, can be calculated by pi = Ri mod |CanA|
and it is used to select the transition with the transition value
same as the pick value. In Figure 2, if Ri is 5, pi will be 2.
For the anonymization process, since the last added segment
is s8, we find the transition value 2 in the 2nd row is located
in the cell (2, 2), which indicates the forward transition from
s8 to s14. For the de-anonymization process, known the last
removed segment s14, the transition value 2 in the cell (2, 2)
here indicates the backward transition from s14 to s8. In such
a way, the forward and backward transitions are selected in
a reversible manner, which guarantees the reversibility of the
whole process.
B. Reversible pre-assignment-based local expansion
The reversible pre-assignment-based local expansion al-
gorithm consists of two steps, namely pre-assignment and
cloaking. Once a new graph is given, it first runs Algorithm 1
to calculate a forward transition list and a backward transition
list for each segment in the graph, which are then used
for anonymization and de-anonymization respectively. The
assignment of transition values should be done carefully as
collisions need to be avoided [6].
We present the process of RPLE with an example shown in
Figure 3. In the example, once the forward transition sequence
moves to the segment s8, it searches the forward transition
list of s8 and selects one candidate s14 from the list as the
next segment to go further. The index of s14 is calculated by
Ri mod 6, where Ri is one pseudo-random number generated
by the secret key and 6 is the length of the forward list. Since
the selection is pseudo-randomly controlled by the secret key,
once the backward transition sequence moves back to s14, with
the same key, it can select s8 from backward transition list of
s14.
IV. DEMONSTRATION TOOLKIT
The demonstration toolkit designed for ReverseCloak is
composed of an ‘Anonymizer’ GUI and a ‘De-anonymizer’
GUI. We show a screenshot of ‘Anonymizer’ GUI in Figure 4.
The visualization of geographic maps, mobile users and cloak-
ing regions is performed through GTMobiSim mobile trace
generator [8], which is based on a real road network map of
northwest part of Atlanta, involving 6979 junctions and 9187
segments, obtained from maps of National Mapping Division
of the USGS. There are 10,000 cars randomly generated
along the roads based on Gaussian distribution. Once a car is
generated, the associated destination is also randomly chosen
and the route selection is based on shortest path routing.
The location data owner first specifies the set of anonymiza-
tion parameters, including the expected number of anonymity
levels, the value of k for k-anonymization in each level, the
spatial tolerance to restrict the allowed maximum area of
cloaking region and the access key for each level. To make it
easier for location data owners, the GUI provides the ‘Auto
key generation’ function to automatically generate and manage
access keys and the ‘Default setting’ function to memorize the
default value of other parameters. By clicking the ‘Anonymize’
button, the ‘Anonymizer’ sends the parameters and access keys
to a trusted anonymization server and visualizes the results
as several colored regions on the map. If the location data
owner feels dissatisfied with the results, she can adjust the
parameters and re-anonymize the location data by clicking the
‘Anonymize’ button again. When the results are satisfactory,
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she can ‘upload’ the cloaking region to the LBS provider
so that the LBS provider can serve the location data owner
based on the privacy privileges and access rights. Later, the
location data requesters can de-anonymize the cloaking region
to get more location information about the location data owner
through the ‘De-anonymizer’. At the beginning, they can only
see the largest cloaking region as the LBS provider. To reduce
the size of the exposed cloaking region, they request the
location data owners for access keys, which is managed locally
by the ‘Anonymizer’. The ‘Anonymizer’ maintains a personal
access control profile, which decides the assignment of access
keys based on trust degree and privileges of the location data
requesters. After fetching the access keys, the location data
requesters can run the de-anonymization algorithm and obtain
the de-anonymized cloaking region as visualized in the ‘De-
anonymizer’ GUI.
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